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Abstract
The urgent challenge of climate change poses a critical test for modern democracy and rules-
based international politics. Democracies need to shift from loose policy commitments to real and 
binding action. Yet, there are enormous collective action problems in combating climate change. 
Can democratic systems evolve to confront the challenge? At global governance level there has 
so far been a failure to generate a sound and effective international framework for managing 
global climate change, whilst at state level solutions are weak and struggle to transcend the 
normal push and pull of partisan politics. By setting out a range of focused governance and policy 
recommendations, this paper proposes steps for reforging a rules-based politics, from the nation 
state to the global level. To coherently combine democracy, markets and universal standards, 
global governance systems need to develop into inclusive and representative institutions with the 
legitimacy and capacity to translate policy commitments into real world outcomes. This will require 
the wealthy industrialised states to shoulder a significant part of the cost of the transformation in 
developing countries. The nation state holds the key; it must broaden and deepen the deliberative 
process through democratic agency, involving citizens and civil society in the making and delivery 
of policy and ensuring that flexible regulation is in place to encourage entrepreneurialism and 
drive technological innovation.
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This paper examines the role of democracy in meeting the urgent challenge of climate change. The 
challenge is multifaceted and multilayered, involving many actors and agencies, and demanding 
effective policy at both the level of the nation-state and global governance. Moreover, it is difficult to 
address because it requires long-term policy commitments, and solutions that depend on complex 
scientific and technical developments. It is also difficult to solve because it involves great costs and 
effort, and because of the complicated distributive implications involved at every turn.
In order to unpack the issues at stake, this paper is structured in five parts. The first section examines 
the relationship between democracy and climate change at the level of the nation-state, briefly 
reviewing existing literature and examining evidence for and against the claim that democracies 
are unable to address the problem. The second section focuses on the same issues in relation to 
global governance, concentrating on the enormous collective action problem that climate change 
poses to an international community of distinct nation-states, and the problem of multiple actors, 
organisational overlap and representation and accountability in international environmental 
institutions. The third section examines the policy debates about climate change, asking about the 
range of options available to nation-states and, in particular, liberal democracies. The fourth section 
focuses on the political elements of a democratic global deal on climate change, while the final 
section draws together the various arguments presented around the theme of democracy and the 
policy menu ahead. 
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At the most basic level, it can be argued that modern liberal democracies suffer from a number 
of structural characteristics that prevent them from tackling global collective action problems in 
general, and climate change in particular. These are: 
Short-termism               
The electoral cycle tends to focus policy debate on short-term political gains and satisfying the median 
voter. The short duration of electoral cycles ensures that politicians are concerned with their own re-
election, which may compromise hard policy decisions that require a great deal of political capital. It 
is extremely difficult for governments to impose large-scale changes on an electorate whose votes 
they depend on, in order to tackle a problem whose impact will only be felt by future generations. 
Self-referring decision-making   
Democratic  theory  and  politics  builds  on  a  notion  of  accountability  linked  to  home  based 
constituencies. It assumes a symmetry and congruence between decision-makers and decision-
takers within the boundaries of the nation-state. Any breakdown of equivalence between these 
parties, i.e. between decision-makers and stakeholders, or between the inputs and outputs of the 
decision-making process, tends not to be heavily weighed. Democratic “princes” and “princesses” 
owe their support to that most virtuous source of power: their people. The externalities or border 
spillover effects of decisions they take are not their primary concern.
 
Interest group concentration   
In democracies, greater interest group pluralism reduces the provision of public goods because 
politicians are forced to adopt polices that cater to the narrow interests of small groups (Olson, 
1982). The democratic process rewards small, well organised interest groups and results in their 
proliferation. Also, strong competition among such groups leads to gridlock in public decision-making, 
delaying both the implementation and effectiveness of public goods provision (Midlarsky, 1998).   
 
Weak multilateralism   
Governments accountable to democratic publics often seek to avoid compliance with binding 
multilateral decisions if this weakens their relationship to their electorate. There is a notable exception; 
it occurs when strong democratic governments can control the multilateral game. 
Concerns such as these have generated scepticism about the compatibility of democratic forms 
of governance with the need for the drastic and urgent changes in policy required to combat 
climate  change.  The  implication  is  that  they  are  unable  to  meet  the  scale  of  the  challenge 
posed  by  climate  change,  and  that  more  coercive  forms  of  government  may  be  necessary. 
Such  thinking  finds  its  historical  precedent  in  the  work  of  the  “eco-authoritarians”  of  the 
1970s, who argued that it might be difficult in democracies to constrain economic activity and 
population growth that results in pressures on the environment. They suggested that some 
aspects of democratic rule would have to be sacrificed to achieve sustainable future outcomes, 
since  authoritarian  regimes  are  not  required  to  pay  as  much  attention  to  citizens’  rights  in 
order to establish effective policy in key areas (Hardin, 1968; Heilbroner, 1974; Ophuls, 1977). 
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                 1. Democracy: the democratic nation-state and climate change1. The authors acknowledge that 
this table does not control for level 
of development and other variables. 
Nonetheless, we think it is a useful 
approximate indicator of emission 
levels during the period when the 
politics of climate change has become 
increasingly acute
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Democracy versus autocracy     
     
This type of argument has, however, been undermined by a body of theory arguing that there 
are a number of reasons why democracies are more likely than authoritarian regimes to protect 
environmental quality (Holden, 2002). Democracies have better access to information, with fewer 
restrictions on media and sources of information, and greater transparency in decision-making 
procedures. They encourage the advance of science, which is responsible for our awareness about 
climate change and other forms of environmental threat in the first place (Giddens, 2008: 74). 
Scientists and other experts are free to engage in research, exchange new evidence and travel to 
and obtain information from other countries. These factors make it more likely that environmental 
issues will be identified and placed on the political agenda, and tackled according to appropriate 
measures of risk. Moreover, concerned citizens can influence political outcomes not only through the 
ballot box, but through pressure groups, social movements and the free media – channels that are 
closed in autocracies. The presence of civil society also serves to inform the public, act as a watchdog 
on public agencies, and directly lobby government (Payne, 1995). There are many examples of cases 
where environmental interest groups have been able to overwhelm business interests pursuing 
environmentally damaging practices and of cases where they have changed the public agenda (Falkner, 
2007; Bernauer & Caduff, 2004). 
At the same time, authoritarian regimes 
have fewer incentives to adopt or stick 
to sustainable policies. Environmental 
concerns  are  often  trumped  by 
economic  development  plans  and 
external security, as was the case with the Soviet regime (Porritt, 1984). Leaders are unaccountable 
to the public, and have less ground to enact long-term policy (Congleton, 1992). And in authoritarian 
regimes, those in power control a substantial fraction of society’s resources, encouraging payoffs to a 
relatively small elite, resulting in less public goods provision (Bueno de Mesquita et. al., 2003). 
It does not seem unreasonable, then, to expect a strong correlation between democracy and 
environmental quality. Indeed, among the 40 highest carbon emitters internationally (cumulatively 
responsible for 91% of total world emissions), the countries that have the best records are all 
democracies; see Figure 1.1
Figure 1: World carbon emissions, by country (measured in millions of metric tonnes of C02)
Rank Country 2000 2006 per capita 
(tonnes), 2006
% change since 
2000
1 China 2966.52 6017.69 4.58 103
2 United States 5860.38 5902.75 19.78 1
3 Russia 1582.37 1704.36 12.00 8
4 India 1012.34 1293.17 1.16 28
5 Japan 1203.71 1246.76 9.78 4
6 Germany 856.92 857.60 10.40 0
7 Canada 565.22 614.33 18.81 9
8 United Kingdom 561.23 585.71 9.66 4
9 South Korea 445.81 514.53 10.53 15
10 Iran 320.69 471.48 7.25 47
11 Italy 448.43 468.19 8.05 4
The implication is that they are unable to meet the scale of the 
challenge posed by climate change, and that more coercive 
forms of government may be necessary12 South Africa 391.67 443.58 10.04 13
13 Mexico 383.44 435.60 4.05 14
14 Saudi Arabia 290.54 424.08 15.70 46
15 France 402.27 417.75 6.60 4
16 Australia 359.80 417.06 20.58 16
17 Brazil 344.91 377.24 2.01 9
18 Spain 326.92 372.62 9.22 14
19 Ukraine 326.83 328.72 7.05 1
20 Poland 295.00 303.42 7.87 3
21 Taiwan 252.15 300.38 13.19 19
22 Indonesia 273.93 280.36 1.21 2
23 Netherlands 251.73 260.45 15.79 3
24 Thailand 161.86 245.04 3.79 51
25 Turkey 202.38 235.70 3.35 16
26 Kazakhstan 143.45 213.50 14.02 49
27 Malaysia 112.14 163.53 6.70 46
28 Argentina 138.42 162.19 4.06 17
29 Venezuela 134.46 151.97 5.93 13
30 Egypt 119.32 151.62 1.92 27
31 United Arab Emirates 115.72 149.52 35.05 29
32 Belgium 148.57 147.58 14.22 -1
33 Singapore 107.64 141.10 31.41 31
34 Pakistan 109.11 125.59 0.78 15
35 Uzbekistan 106.35 120.84 4.43 14
36 Czech Republic 113.45 116.30 11.36 3
37 Greece 101.27 107.07 10.02 6
38 Nigeria 80.75 101.07 0.77 25
39 Iraq 73.58 98.95 3.69 34
40 Romania 93.33 98.64 4.42 6
Source: (EIA, 2006)
However, upon closer examination, the record is less compelling, and detailed empirical evidence 
is inconclusive. Environmental quality is not just measured by a broad based commitment to 
addressing emissions of carbon and other greenhouse gases (GHGs). While some studies have shown 
that authoritarian regimes have worse records than democracies on environmental protection,2   
others find no evidence to suggest that this is the case.3  Indeed across a range of measures and 
geographical areas numerous studies prove that outcomes are varied.  
On balance, while evidence on the link between political institutions and environmental sustainability 
does seem to suggest that democracies are preferable to authoritarian regimes, we might expect the 
effect to be far greater than it actually is. Why is this the case? Part of the reason might be attributed 
to the different types of transmission mechanisms that translate policy commitment into policy 
outcomes. Battig & Bernauer (2009), for example, find that while the effect of democracy on political 
commitment to climate change is positive, the effect on policy outcomes, measured in terms of 
emissions and trends, is ambiguous. They observe that the causal chain from environmental risks to 
public perceptions of such risks, to public demand for risk mitigation, and to policy output is shorter 
than the one leading from risk via policy output to policy outcome. Because of that, outcomes are 
influenced by a range of other factors, such as the properties of the resource in question, mitigation 
2. See Jancar-Webster (1993) and 
Desai (1998).
3. Cf. Grafton & Knowles (2004).
4. Midlarsky (1998) finds that democ-
racies have a good record on land area 
protection, but not on deforestation, 
CO2 emissions and soil erosion, while 
Didia (1997) holds that democratic 
countries in the tropics have lower 
deforestation rates, and Bhattarai 
& Hammig (2001) claim a similar 
result in Latin America and Africa. 
Li & Reuveny (2006) show a positive 
effect for democracy on emissions, 
deforestation, land degradation, and 
water pollution, but Barrett & Grady 
(2000) find that while political and civil 
freedoms mostly impact positively 
on air pollution, results for water pol-
lution are mixed, and Torras & Boyce 
(1998) maintain that democracy is 
statistically insignificant for dissolved 
oxygen, fecal coliform and particulates 
emissions. Nuemayer (2002) demon-
strates that democracies sign more 
multilateral environmental treaties 
and comply more fully with interna-
tional obligations, while Ward (2008) 
claims that liberal democracies gener-
ally promote sustainability in fossil 
fuel emissions, but only very weakly.
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costs, and the efficiency of implementing agencies. Politicians might easily declare a set of public 
policy commitments to climate change mitigation, but the outcome of such efforts is affected by 
factors that are often outside of their control. The result is that policymakers respond quite well to 
public demands for more environmental protection, but tend to discount implementation problems, 
hoping that voters will not be able to identify these within a short enough time period to use their 
votes as a punishment for any failure to deliver. 
Political commitment and the deliberative democracy approach
An additional concern is that political commitment to tackling climate change is critical, yet may 
require political leaders to adhere to a particular course of action that is potentially unpopular, and 
hence contrary to structural democratic pressures. The actual implementation of policies that reduce 
global warming may infringe on the democratic preferences of citizens. In such a context, political 
leaders can be caught between a desire for recognition and esteem in the international community – 
recognition that comes from peer admiration for leadership – and the need to ensure accountability 
to domestic electorates (Keohane & Raustiala, 2008). However, good democratic leadership is not 
confined to policymaking alone – it also involves educating constituents about pressing issues that 
may not be obvious to them. In this sense, the fact that democratic publics do not always have fully 
formed preferences is an advantage as well as a risk. Citizens can significantly shift their preferences, 
faced with new information and evidence about pressing issues. The democratic citizen that is 
capable of being “fact-regarding, future-regarding and other-regarding,” is not simply a myth (Offe 
& Preuss, 1991: 156-7, in Held, 2006a: 232).
Such an approach to democratic “will formation” can be found within the tradition of what is known 
as deliberative democracy, broadly defined as “any one of a family of views according to which the 
public deliberation of free and equal citizens is the core of legitimate political decision-making and 
self-governance” (Bohman, 1998: 401). 
Deliberative democrats advocate that democracy moves away from any notion of fixed and given 
preferences, to be replaced with a view that democracy should become a learning process in and 
through which people come to terms with the range of issues they need to understand in order to 
hold defensible positions. They argue that no set of values or particular perspectives can lay claim 
to being correct and valid by themselves, but rather are valid only in so far as they are capable of 
public justification (Offe & Preuss, 1991: 168). Individual points of view need to be tested in and 
through social encounters which take into account the point of view of others. Ultimately, the key 
objective is the transformation of private preferences via a process of deliberation into positions 
that can withstand public scrutiny and test. Empirical findings show that citizens can and do alter 
their preferences when they engage with new information, fresh evidence and debate (Held, 2006a: 
247-255).These can lead to new and innovative ideas about public policy and about how democracy 
might function and work. 
Deliberative  democracy  can,  in  principle,  increase  the  quality,  legitimacy  and  therefore  the 
sustainability of environmental policy decisions. This is partly due to the uncertainty associated with 
environmental issues, which demands a wide range of experience, expertise and consultation. The 
complexity of climate change problems also require integrated solutions that have been vetted by 
multiple actors and that cut across the narrow confines of expert knowledge and the responsibilities 
of established institutions and organisations. And the concerns of environmental justice require the 
political process to be as inclusive as possible, giving voice to the under represented, including future 
generations. Effective and just action on climate change depends upon the continuing involvement of citizens in the making and delivery of policy; conventional representative democracy is a poor 
way to achieve this alone. To remodel environmental politics around deliberative democracy is thus 
to create an opening for a change in the way democracies address environmental management in 
general, and climate change in particular.
In shifting from policy commitments to real 
and binding action, democracies have all too 
often been unable to override the problems 
of short-termism, collective action and other 
factors that cut against emission reductions 
efforts. This is not to say that democracies are 
incapable of tackling climate change (certainly the alternative, in the form of authoritarian regimes, 
seems to be far worse).  Rather, certain aspects of them typically fall short. The question now is whether 
democratic systems can be evolved to handle the problem better, and how this may be achieved.   
Complex global processes, from the ecological to the financial, connect the fate of communities to 
each other across the world, yet the problem solving capacity of the global system is in many areas 
not effective, accountable, or fast enough to resolve current global challenges. What has been called 
the paradox of our times refers to the fact that the collective issues we must grapple with are of 
growing cross-border extensity and intensity, but the means for addressing these are state-based, 
weak and incomplete (Held, 2006b). While there are a variety of reasons for the existence of these 
problems, at the most basic level the persistence of the paradox remains a problem of governance. 
The abilities of states to address critical issues at the regional and global level are handicapped by 
a number of structural difficulties, domestic and international, which compound the problems of 
generating and implementing urgent policies with respect to global goods and bads. 
One significant problem is that a growing number of issues span both the domestic and the 
international domains. The institutional fragmentation and competition between states can lead 
to these issues being addressed in an ad hoc and dissonant manner. A second problem is that even 
when the global dimension of a problem is acknowledged, there is often no clear division of labour 
among the myriad of international institutions that seek to address it: their functions frequently 
overlap, their mandates conflict and their objectives often become blurred. A third problem is that 
the existing system of global governance suffers from significant deficits of accountability and 
inclusion, which can result in less economically powerful states and, hence, their entire populations 
being marginalised or excluded from decision making.
Today, there is a newfound recognition that global problems cannot be solved by any one nation-
state acting alone, nor by states just fighting their corner in regional blocs. What is required is 
collective and collaborative action – something that the nations of the world have not been good at, 
and which they need to be much better at if the most pressing issues are to be adequately tackled. 
The failure to generate a sound and effective framework for managing global climate change is one 
of the most serious indications of the challenges facing the multilateral order. The former British chief 
scientist Sir David King has warned that the threat posed by climate change is more serious than that 
of terrorism (2004: 177), and Sir Nicholas Stern has referred to it as “the greatest market failure the 
world has ever seen” (2004: xviii). In the broad view of the scientific community climate change has 
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Deliberative  democracy  can,  in  principle, 
increase the quality, legitimacy and therefore the 
sustainability of environmental policy decisions 
               2. Democracy : global governance and climate change5. We would like to thank Michael 
Mason for his guidance through this 
maze of agents and agencies.
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the capacity to wreak havoc on the world’s diverse species, bio-systems and socioeconomic fabric, 
and the process has clearly begun.
Anarchic inefficiency 
The number of actors and variety of organisations involved in both agenda setting and policymaking 
at the level of global environmental governance has increased substantially over the past decade. 
In addition to private, public and civil society actors, new types of actors have emerged such as 
transnational activist networks (Keck & Sikkink, 1998), private rule-making organisations (Prakash 
& Potoski, 2006), government agencies and public-private partnerships (Borzel & Risse, 2005). 
Moreover, established organisations have adopted new roles and responsibilities. For example, 
many intergovernmental organisations have acquired a higher degree of autonomy from the 
governments that have established them, and many NGOs now engage in agenda setting, policy 
formulation and the establishment of rules and regulations (Corell & Betsill, 2001). However, the 
increased engagement of diverse actors does not necessarily guarantee either effectiveness or equal 
access of diverse voice. In fact, it often leads to double representation of the west and north through 
both powerful states and NGOs (Kahler, 2005, Biermann & Pattberg, 2008).
At the institutional level, while many international environmental agreements exist, and possess some 
admirable characteristics, they are often both poorly coordinated and weakly enforced. Furthermore, 
they are supported by a plethora of different international organisations fulfilling various functions. 
The current constellation of over 200 international environmental agreements suffers from a problem 
of what might be called “anarchic inefficiency,” featuring a diverse set of players whose roles are 
largely uncoordinated among each other. The most prominent include: 5
The UN system, including the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
the Environmental Management Group (EMG) and the Centre for Sustainable Development (CSD) 
While international action on climate change relies overwhelmingly on the evidence presented 
by the UNFCCC (including the Kyoto Protocol), the UN system overall has so far been ineffective 
in  reducing  GHG  emissions,  and  is  hampered  by  major  divisions  between  north  and  south. 
The  internal  UN  system  is  also  still  arguably  uncoordinated  on  climate  change,  although 
there  are  plans  to  change  this  (UN  System  Chief  Executives  Board  for  Coordination,  2008). 
The EMG, chaired by United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), is a key vehicle for this 
cooperation, but it remains too early to judge its progress. The CSD has engaged with NGOs in a 
constructive manner, and has an important agenda-setting role, but is also relatively ineffective. 
 
Global Environment Facility (GEF)  
The GEF has a climate change remit, including serving as the main financial mechanism for UNFCCC. 
However, it has suffered legitimacy problems: developing countries have opposed GEF control of 
the Kyoto Adaptation Fund, perceiving a voting bias in favour of richer countries and the control of 
the World Bank. The current governance structure of the Adaptation Fund is regarded as an interim 
solution until this can be resolved. Elsewhere, the GEF has delivered important grants for climate 
change mitigation and adaptation, but has a tendency to support smaller technical or pilot projects 
that are not mainstreamed in countries or economic sectors.
The OECD Environmental Directorate   
While this division of the OECD is technically proficient (having conducted agenda-setting work, 
for example, on environmental indicators and economic modelling of carbon markets) it is globally 
unrepresentative. It also regards climate change as amenable to technical, pro-growth economic 
 
p
o
l
i
c
y
 
n
e
t
w
o
r
k
 
p
a
p
e
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of problems of accountability and 
representation in the transnational 
governance of environmental harm, 
see Mason (2008).
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solutions, contrary to the views held by many of the key actors in the debate. 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) Committee on Trade and Environment   
Collaboration between the UNEP and the WTO was proposed in 2006, yet the Committee has not 
even been able to agree to a limited environmental package within the Doha Round. There is little 
appetite to recognise climate change damage as grounds for unilateral member state exceptions 
(GATT/WTO Article XX) to world trade rules. Collaboration is, therefore, largely symbolic – the WTO is 
seeking more environmental legitimacy, while the UNEP wants access to WTO deliberations.
Environmental Chamber of the International Court for Justice (ICJ)   
The ICJ has thus far played an insignificant role, with no cases since its formation in 1993. It has been 
hampered by limited rules of standing and divided opinion over the need for a separate International 
Court for the Environment (Stephens, 2009). 
Representation and the responsibility of the wealthy
Problems with representation at the level of global governance are high on the list of obstacles 
to addressing climate change.6  Multilateral bodies need to be inclusive; unless both developed 
and less developed states come on board, the net reduction of GHG emissions becomes a much 
harder task, if it can be achieved at all. Ensuring effective representation is not a question of just 
providing a seat at the negotiating table in a major IGO or at a major conference. For even if 
there is parity of formal representation (a condition typically lacking), it is generally the case that 
developed countries have large delegations equipped with extensive negotiating and technical 
expertise, while poorer developing countries frequently depend on one person delegations, or have 
even to rely on the sharing of a delegate, and lack the negotiating strength to participate fully in 
discussions (Chasek & Rajamani, 2003). This is indicative not only of the problem of unequal access 
to decision-making, but of inequality of all types of resource. Many developing countries do not 
readily command the public funds, capacity or technology to come into compliance with agreed 
regulations designed to reduce emissions. As a result any future agreement cannot simply build on 
the traditional burden sharing approach of dealing with a problem inherent in the global commons; 
given the scale of transformation that is required for a sustainable future, wealthy industrialised 
states will have to bear a significant part of the cost of the transformation in developing countries.   
The greatest differences in the debate about the politics of climate change tend be revealed in issues 
of how to square the circle of participation, effectiveness and compliance. Or, to put the point more 
broadly – is it possible to combine coherently democracy, markets and universal standards? (Held, 
2004: ch 9). The answer is far from straightforward; if international rules become stricter, we can 
expect reluctant states to become even more reluctant to be bound by them, while if participation 
increases, agreement may only become possible via lax rules (Keohane & Raustiala, 2008).
A critical component of a global deal will be the way in which market incentives are structured. In 
terms of targeting GHG emissions, two principal market-based instruments exist: cap and trade and 
taxation. Supporters of the former include Stern (2009) who points out a number of disadvantages 
with taxes. They do not allow certainty over how big future GHG reductions will be, since estimates 
are imprecise and there is a long lag time between policy output and actual outcomes. They are hard 
to coordinate internationally, and developing countries are unlikely to agree such arrangements, 
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                 3. The policy debate: squaring the circle?which impose economic burdens on industries without offering the offsetting gain of being able to 
sell emissions permits.  Moreover, electorates in general are mistrustful of governments’ use of tax 
resources, potentially opposing them in the belief they provide an excuse for “stealth taxation”. A 
better approach is to set targets, and then seek out the cheapest method (via the price mechanism) 
of reaching those. 
The cap and trade system
According to its supporters, cap and trade makes the most sense of the options available, because 
it allows for greater certainty about eventual emissions levels and produces better incentives for 
producers.7 At this point, it also appears to be the approach most likely to be adopted at the global 
level, with a European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS) already in place, and a successful 
precedent in the form of markets for sulphur in the United States. However, global markets in carbon 
and other GHGs are likely to be far larger and more complex than any previous emissions trading 
schemes, with a commensurate increase in levels of risk, opportunity for leakage and distributional 
consequences. Negotiating a comprehensive global accord and meshing national systems so that 
they operate coherently will be a highly fraught and difficult process, if it can be achieved at all.  
Indeed, while cap-and-trade seems to be an ideal 
solution on the surface, it is in fact an odd way to do 
business. Politicians like it because it is market-based, 
does not require the imposition of unpopular taxes, 
and can be worked out with special interest groups 
in back room negotiations. Indeed, with regular auctions to sell off emitting rights, and the lack of a 
long term or stable price, cap and trade is a lobbyist and trader’s dream (Helm, 2008). Yet, putting the 
dangers of rent seeking aside, it is not even clear that cap and trade will lead to required emissions 
reductions. As Sachs (2009: 2) observes, “a cap-and-trade system can be more easily manipulated to 
allow additional emissions; if the permits become too pricey, regulators would likely sell or distribute 
more permits to keep the price ‘reasonable.’ Since the long-term signals from cap-and-trade are less 
powerful than a multi-year carbon tax, the behavioural changes (e.g. choice of the type of power 
plant) brought about by cap-and-trade could well turn out to be far fewer, as well.” Such concerns 
are borne out by the existing record on carbon emissions trading. The global market grew to £126 
billion last year, up from £63 billion in 2007 and nearly 12 times the value in 2005. This represented 
the value of a total of 4.8 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide, up 61% from the 3 billion tonnes traded in 
2007. However, the actual emissions cuts made and sold by United Nations-registered clean energy 
projects in developing countries fell by 30 % in 2008  to 389 million tonnes (Chestney & Szabo, 
2009). 
A tax on carbon 
Contrary to the claims of cap and trade advocates, it can thus be countered that taxes are less 
likely to result in policy failure. Economic efficiency demands that those who create emissions 
should pay the costs, and taxes are the simplest way of forcing them to do so. Their advantages 
are many. They offer a broader scope for emissions reductions, as opposed to trading systems 
which can only be implemented among private firms or countries, and not among households and 
individual consumers. In this sense, they are the more democratic option, since they create greater 
coverage and are less susceptible to strategic lobbying for exceptions by firms or non-governmental 
organisations. Their universal guiding principle is distributive, since they simultaneously discriminate 
against polluters while allocating priority to the most vital cases of environmental need. They involve 
7. As Stern (2009: 104) points out, 
greater certainty about emissions 
levels comes with less certainty about 
prices. Unfortunately there is always 
trade off – it is impossible to achieve 
both price and quantity certainty in 
an uncertain world. In this case, he 
suggests that price uncertainty is the 
lesser of the two evils.
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Is it possible to combine coherently democracy, 
markets and universal standards?less administrative costs, are less complicated and more familiar to policymakers, and provide new 
avenues of generating revenue to tackle climate change for governments that are increasingly 
unwilling to incur political costs by expanding general taxation. Finally, they place a clear price on 
emissions for many years ahead, allowing for better long term policy planning. Of course, there 
remains the substantial challenge of shifting taxation structures away from their primary focus on 
work and production toward a greater emphasis on pollution, externalities and consumption. It goes 
without saying that this will require a great effort, marked by short-term and long term objectives, 
which could be weakened by new election results, changing coalitions and so on. 
A new policy mix
In reality, the policy mix is likely to contain multiple policy instruments. The prospect of large revenues 
from permit auctions has established significant political and economic interests in the creation and 
maintenance of markets for GHGs. Cap and trade also offers the potential for far greater levels of 
private sector funding than is the case for government financed funds and schemes, and will create 
significant private sector flows from developed to developing countries, an absolute necessity for 
reaching a global deal. However, if policymakers are serious about putting a true price on carbon and 
other GHGs – essential if markets are to sort out efficient supply and demand side responses – then 
taxation will have to form a key element of policy as well, in order to ensure predictability of outcome, 
and the generation of new resources for the provision of urgent environmental goods. 
Unfortunately, putting a price on all GHG emissions 
(whether through tradable permits or taxes) is not 
enough on its own to deliver the needed reductions. 
Existing market-based schemes, such as the EU ETS, 
or carbon taxation by individual European countries 
and US states, have so far failed to generate large 
scale research into the development of breakthrough 
technologies. Such schemes might eventually result in a levelling off or even a slight reduction of 
emissions, but will only stimulate a marginal diversification into alternative forms of energy such as 
solar and wind power. This is because private sector firms under invest in research and development 
if they fear they will not be able to earn a decent profit on resulting product development. What 
is  ultimately  required  is  a  fundamental  overhaul  of  energy  systems  through  transformative 
technologies that require a combination of factors to succeed – not only market incentives, but 
also applied scientific research, early high-cost investments, regulatory changes (e.g. building codes 
and practices), infrastructural development, information instruments (e.g. eco-labelling of energy 
appliances) and public acceptance. 
To ensure flexibility and encourage innovation, regulations should be based on achieving particular 
results, rather than simply specifying the methods or technologies to be used to achieve those 
outcomes (OECD, 2007). Care needs to be taken in choosing instruments in a policy mix to ensure 
that they are complementary and avoid unnecessary overlap, and that they are cost-effective. By 
setting too high a price or too tight a cap, policy will result in excess costs, while choosing policies 
that are too lenient will forego the potential benefits of added, cost-effective mitigation measures 
and risk the failure of meeting required targets. 
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Climate change is a problem with global causes and consequences. A coordinated international 
effort is therefore required to achieve cost effective and successful mitigation policies. However, the 
nature of the problem also means that international agreements will be difficult to reach. Countries 
and regions have very different interests in achieving a solution, implying a highly contested 
distribution of costs and benefits. In addition, developing countries, given their relatively small 
contribution to historical emissions, object to having their development impeded by restrictions. 
Finally, the challenges associated with enforcing a global solution may make some nations reluctant 
to participate, adding a source of uncertainty about how cost-effective the policies will be (CBO, 2005). 
However, despite the vigorous debate surrounding the type of policies required to combat climate 
change and how they should or should not be implemented, there is considerable overlap on what 
the political elements of a global deal might look like. At the most general level, most commentators 
agree that it should be broadly inclusive, multi-faceted, state-centric and sustainable. 
Participation
The key requirement is participation from all countries, and most importantly, participation by the 
most powerful democracy in the world. The world has been waiting for the United States to join 
the collective effort against climate change; there is now reason to believe that it is ready to act 
(Stiglitz & Stern, 2009). The integration of less developed states is also crucial, as already noted. Even 
if the developed states of the world were to cut their emissions to zero by 2050, without significant 
cuts in the rest of the world the overall goal of keeping a global rise in temperatures to under 20C 
would be missed. Developing countries need to be convinced that they can simultaneously reduce 
their emissions and increase their growth rate by increasing their energy efficiency. They need, for 
instance, to eliminate distortions in their energy markets, such as large oil subsidies. But for most 
developing countries, the cheapest form of energy is coal (or other high-emission energy sources), 
and in those cases, there is a real trade-off. Money spent to reduce GHG emissions is money that 
could be spent to provide education, better health and clean water, or to grow faster. In such cases, 
developed countries, it can be argued, should pay for the incremental costs.  However, as Victor et. 
al. (2009) have pointed out, this is unlikely to happen – it is simply unrealistic to expect industrialised 
nations to contribute the tens or hundreds of billions 
of dollars needed for such a compensation scheme 
when  official  development  assistance  (including 
for wars in Iraq and Afghanistan) currently stands at 
around $100 billion for all purposes. Moreover, the 
countries that would get the most compensation, 
such as China, are now west’s most potent economic 
competitors. 
Offset schemes and financial incentives
The alternative is some form of offset scheme that allows industrialised nations to fund emissions 
reductions  in  developing  nations,  and  counting  those  reductions  towards  their  own  legal 
commitments. The idea is that this would require industrialised nations to pay a majority of the costs 
while also laying a foundation for the creation of a global emissions trading market. This was the aim 
behind the creation of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). However, although the CDM has, 
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such  as  China,  are  now  the  west’s  most  potent 
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after a difficult start, been successful in creating a global market for GHGs, its design is fundamentally 
flawed, and it has done very little to actually cut emissions or to assist host countries in achieving 
sustainable development (Pearson, 2005; Olsen, 2007, Muller 2007). 
Another important requirement will be the prevention of deforestation, which contributes 17% of 
current carbon emissions, almost twice as much as transport (IPCC, 2007). Developing countries’ 
tropical forests are an important source of carbon sequestration, yet they are not provided with any 
compensation for these environmental services. Providing them with financial incentives will help 
to reduce emissions from forested lands and invest in low-carbon paths to sustainable development. 
In this regard, encouraging steps have been made in the implementation of the United Nations 
Fund for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (UN-REDD). However, the 
establishment of a final framework for the transfer of funds is still some years away, with a final 
agreement only likely to come into effect after 2012. Moreover, there are serious concerns about the 
appropriate geographical scale of accounting and incentive mechanisms, monitoring, land tenure, 
elite capture of funds and the potential for fraud (Karousakis & Coffee-Merlot, 2007; Olander et. al, 
2009; Bond et. al, 2009). .
Participation and deliberation on a global scale 
are necessary, yet in their current forms, existing 
instruments of global environmental governance 
are ill-equipped to achieve results. What is needed 
are  representative  institutions  armed  with  the 
capacity and legitimacy required to translate policy commitments into real world outcomes. If a 
global deal is going to work it must have an answer to the problem of governance, and embody 
an institutional structure that shapes and determines decisions which reflect the whole world in an 
even-handed way. Recourse to inclusive and broadly representative global decision-making channels 
is the most appropriate and effective way of doing this, and strengthening mechanisms of global 
governance will be key to constructing a global democratic response to the issue. 
The challenge of tackling climate change will require the development of considerable additional 
institutional capacity and policy innovation. The goal of achieving this capacity, and the means to 
get there, will be undermined if countries of all stages of development are not directly involved in 
the shaping of solutions. Current policy development demonstrates this concern. The short term 
path to effective environmental governance is to integrate a broader set of interests into existing 
multilateral governance capacity. The existing mandate of the GEF could be broadened in order to 
help coordinate and fund international environmental agreements and reflect developing country 
priorities. Complementary to this, the UNEP could increase its status and responsibilities by becoming 
a specialised UN agency, with all the compulsory UN funding that this entails. The central challenge 
in the years ahead of compliance monitoring and enforcement could be facilitated through a formal 
international mechanism for settling environmental disputes through mediation and arbitration, 
potentially similar to the World Bank’s investment dispute body (Mabey, 2007). Enhancing the 
capacities and responsibilities of the GEF and the UNEP in this way would be a step toward the more 
consolidated and formal institutional capacity of a World Environmental Organisation as a longer 
term goal, driven perhaps by the G2 + 1 (the USA, China and the EU), but accountable to the G195.
A World Environmental Organisation as a longer term 
goal, driven perhaps by the G2 + 1, but accountable 
to the G195
                 5. Democracy and the policy menu ahead
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The key role of the state
In all of these challenges, states remain the key actors, as they hold the key to both domestic and 
international policymaking. The implementation of international agreements will be up to individual 
states, emissions trading and carbon pricing will require domestic legislation, and technological 
advance will need state support to get off the ground (Giddens, 2008). However, state strategies at 
the domestic level should involve the creation of incentives, not overly tight regulation. Governments 
have an important role in “editing” choice, but not in a way that precludes it altogether. This approach 
is represented in the form of what Giddens (2008) calls “the ensuring state,” whose primary role is 
help energise a diversity of groups to reach solutions to collective action problems. The state, so 
conceived, acts as a facilitator and an enabler, rather than as a top-down agency. An ensuring state 
is one that has the capacity to produce definite outcomes. The principle goes even further; it also 
means a state that is responsible for monitoring public goals and for trying to make sure they are 
realised in a visible and legitimate fashion. 
This will require a return to planning – not in the old 
sense of top down hierarchies of control, but in a new 
sense of flexible regulation. This will require finding 
ways to introduce regulation without undermining 
the entrepreneurialism and innovation upon which 
successful responses will depend. It will not be a 
straightforward process, because planning must be reconciled with democratic freedoms. There will 
be push and pull between the political centre, regions and localities, which can only be resolved 
through deliberation and consultation. Most importantly, states will require a long term vision that 
transcends the normal push and pull of partisan politics. This will not be easy to achieve. 
All this takes place in the context of a changing world order. The power structure on which the 1945 
multilateral settlement was based is no longer intact, and the relative decline of the west and the rise 
of Asia raises fundamental questions about the premises of the 1945 multilateral order. Democracy 
and the international community now face a critical test. However, addressing the issue of climate 
change successfully holds out the prospect of reforging a rule-based politics, from the nation-state to 
the global level. Table 1 highlights what we consider to be the necessary steps to be taken along this 
road. By contrast, failure to meet the challenge could have deep and profound consequences, both 
for what people make of modern democratic politics and for the idea of rule-governed international 
politics. Under these conditions, the structural flaws of democracy could be said to have tragically 
trumped democratic agency and deliberative capacity. 
Governments have an important role in “editing” 
choice,  but  not  in  a  way  that  precludes  it 
altogether
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Table 1
Guiding principles
Inclusiveness, political equality, deliberation, environmental sustainability, and economic effectiveness
                                       Governance Policy
Nation-state
• Broadening and deepening of the delib-
erative process.
• Transformation of private preferences via 
a process of deliberation into positions that 
can withstand public scrutiny and test.
• Continued involvement of citizens and 
civil society in the making and delivery of 
policy
• Leadership that confronts narrow inter-
ests, and sets out compelling scientific and 
economic case for action
• Taxation of carbon and other GHGs
• Just and equitable markets for carbon and 
other GHGs
• Applied scientific research 
• Early high-cost investments
• Regulatory changes
• Infrastructural development
• Information instruments
Global
• Promotion of inclusive and broadly 
representative global decision-making 
channels
• Assistance for developing countries to 
access necessary resources, capacity and 
technology for mitigation and adaptation.
• Broaden the existing mandate of the GEF
• Increase the status and responsibility of 
the UNEP by upgrading to a specialised UN 
agency.
• Develop effective offset schemes that allow 
industrialised nations to fund emissions 
reductions in developing nations
• Establishment of a formal international 
mechanism for settling environmental 
disputes through mediation and arbitration.
• Development of formal institutional 
capacity for a World Environmental 
Organisation
 
                 Summary of governance and policy recommendations
17   |   Democracy, climate change and global governance   |   David Held & Angus Fane Hervey   |   November 2009
p
o
l
i
c
y
 
n
e
t
w
o
r
k
 
p
a
p
e
rp
o
l
i
c
y
 
n
e
t
w
o
r
k
 
p
a
p
e
r
18   |   Citizenship: tool or reward?   |   Elena Jurado  |   February 2008 www.policy-network.net 18   |   Democracy, climate change and global governance   |   David Held & Angus Fane Hervey   |   November 2009
Baber, Walter and Robert Bartlet (2009) Global Democracy and Sustainable Jurisprudence, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Barrett, Scott, and Kathryn Graddy (2000) “Freedom, Growth, and the Environment,” Environment and Development 
Economics, 5 
Bättig, Michele and Thomas Bernauer (2009) “National Institutions and Global Public Goods: Are Democracies More 
Cooperative in Climate Change Policy?” International Organisation, 63(2).
Bernauer, Thomas and Ladina Caduff (2004) “In Whose Interest? Pressure Group Politics, Economic Competition and 
Environmental Regulation,” Journal of Public Policy, 24(1). 
Betstill, Michele and Elizabeth Corell (2001) “NGO Influence in International Environmental Negotiations: A Framework 
for Analysis,” Global Environmental Politics 1(4) 
Bhattarai , Madhusudan and Michael Hammig (2001) “Institutions and the Environmental Kuznets Curve for Deforestation: 
A Cross-country Analysis for Latin America, Africa and Asia,” World Development, 29(6).
Biermann, Frank and Philipp Pattberg (2008) “Global Environmental Governance: Taking Stock, Moving Forward,” 
Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 33.
Bohman, James (1998) “The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy,” The Journal of Political Philosophy, 6(4).
Börzel, Tanja, and Thomas Risse (2005) “Public Private Partnerships: Effective and Legitimate
Tools for Transnational Governance?” in Edgar Grande and Louis Pauly, eds., Complex Sovereignty. Reconstituting 
Political Authority in the Tweny First Century, Toronto:University of Toronto Press
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James Morrow (2003) The Logic of Political Survival, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
CBO (2005) “Uncertainty in Analyzing Climate Change: Policy Implications,” Report for the Congressional Budget Office 
of the Unites States.
Chasek, Pamela and Lavanya Rajamani (2003) “Steps Toward Enhanced Parity: Negotiating Capacity and Strategies of 
Developing Countries,” in Inge Kaul, Pedro Conceicão, Katell Le Goulven and Ronald Mendoza, Providing Global 
Public Goods: Managing Globalisation, New York: Oxford University Press.
Chestney, Nina and Michael Szabo (2009) “Global carbon market doubled in 2008, cut less CO2,” Reuters, 27 May.
Congleton, Roger (1992) “Political institutions and pollution control,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 74. 
Desai, Uday, (1998) ‘Environment, Economic Growth, and Government’, in Uday Desai, ed., Ecological Policy and Politics 
in Developing Countries, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 
Didia, Dal (1997) “Democracies, political instability and tropical deforestation,” Global Environmental Change, 7(1). 
Falkner, Robert (2007) Business Power and Conflict in International Environmental Politics, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
Giddens, Tony (2008), The Politics of Climate Change, Cambridge: Polity. 
Grafton, Quentin and Stephen Knowles (2004) “Social capital and national  environmental performance: a cross-sectional 
analysis,” Journal of Environment and Development, 13(4).
Hardin, Greg (1968) “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science, 162.
Heilbroner, Richard (1974) Inquiry into the human prospect, New York: Norton. 
Held, David & Anthony McGrew (2007) Globalisation/Anti-Globalisation: Beyond the Great Divide, Cambridge: Polity. 
Held, David (2004) Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus, Cambridge, Polity 
Press.
Held, David (2006a) Models of Democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Held, David (2006b) “Reframing Global Governance: Apocalypse Soon or Reform!” New Political Economy, 11(2).
Helm, Deiter (2008), “Climate-change policy: why has so little been achieved? Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 
24(2).
Holden, Barry (2002) Democracy and Global Warming, London and New York: Continuum. 
EIA (2006) International Energy Annual 2006, United States Energy Information Administration. 
                              References
p
o
l
i
c
y
 
n
e
t
w
o
r
k
 
p
a
p
e
rp
o
l
i
c
y
 
n
e
t
w
o
r
k
 
p
a
p
e
r
19   |   Citizenship: tool or reward?   |   Elena Jurado  |   February 2008 www.policy-network.net
IPCC (2007) Synthesis Report of the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report, International Panel on Climate Change.
Jancar-Webster,  Barbara  (1993),  “Eastern  Europe  and  the  Former  Soviet  Union,”  in  Sheldon  Kamieniecki,  ed., 
Environmental Politics in the International Arena: Movements, Parties, Organisations and Policy, Albany: State 
University of New York Press.
Kahler, Miles (2005) “Defining Accountability Up: The Global Economic Multilaterals,” in David Held and Mathias Koenig-
Archibugi, eds., Global Governance and Public Accountability. Oxford: Blackwell
Karousakis, Katia and Jan Corfee-Morlot (2007) Financing mechanisms to reduce emissions from deforestation: Issues in 
design and implementation, OECD/IEA information paper, Annex I Expert Group on the UNFCCC, Paris; OECD.
Keck, Margaret, and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press
Keohane, Robert & Kal Raustiala (2008) “Toward a Post-Kyoto Climate Change Architecture: A Political Analysis,“ UCLA 
School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 08-14. 
Keohane, Robert (2003) ‘Global Governance and Democratic Accountability’, in David Held and Mathias Koenig-
Archibugi, eds., Taming Globalisation: Frontiers of Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press.
King, Sir David (2004) “Climate Change Science: Adapt, Mitigate, or Ignore?” Science, 303.
Li, Quan & Rafael Reuveny (2006) “Democracy and Environmental Degradation,” International Studies Quarterly 50(4).
Mabey, Nick (2007) “Sustainability and Foreign Policy,” in David Held and David Mepham, eds., Progressive Foreign 
Policy: New Directions for the UK, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Mason, Michael (2008) “The Governance of Transnational Environmental Harm: Addressing New Modes of Accountability/
Responsibility,” Global Environmental Politics, 8.
Midlarsky, Manus (1998) “Democracy and the environment: an empirical assessment,” Journal of Peace Research, 
35(3).
Muller, A. 2007 (2007) “How to make the Clean Development Mechanism sustainable—The potential of rent extraction,” 
Energy Policy, 35(3)
Munton, Richard (2003) “Deliberative democracy and environmental decisionmaking,” in Frans Berkhout, Melissa Leach, 
and Ian Scoones, eds., Negotiating Environmental Change: New Perspectives from Social Science, Cheltenham, 
Edward Elgar.
Neumayer, Eric (2002) “Do democracies exhibit stronger international environmental commitment? A cross-country 
analysis,” Journal of Peace Research, 39(2).
OECD (2007) “Climate Change Policies,” OECD Policy Brief August 2007, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. 
Offe, Claus, and Ulrich Preuss (1991) “Democratic Institutions and Moral Resources,” in David Held, ed., Political Theory 
Today, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Olander, Lydia, William Boyd, Kathleen Lawlor,  Erin Myers Madeira, John Niles (2009) “International Forest Carbon 
and the Climate Change Challenge: Issues and Options,” Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions 
Report, Report No. 09-05.
Olsen, Karen (2007) “The clean development mechanism’s contribution to sustainable development: a review of the 
literature,” Climatic Change, 84.
Olson, Mancur (1982) The Rise and Decline of Nations, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press. 
Ophuls, William (1977) Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity, San Francisco: Freeman. 
Payne, Rodger (1995) “Freedom and the Environment,” Journal of Democracy 6(3).
Pearson, Ben(2007) “Market failure: why the Clean Development Mechanism won’t promote clean development,” 
Journal of Cleaner Production, 15
Porritt, Jonathan (1984) Seeing Green: The Politics of Ecology Explained, Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell.
Prakash Aseem and Matthew Potoski (2006) The Voluntary Environmentalists: Green Clubs, ISO 14001, and Voluntary 
Environmental Regulations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sachs, Jeffrey (2008) “Keys to Climate Protection,” Scientific American Magazine, April. 
Sachs, Jeffrey (2009) “Putting a Price on Carbon: An Emissions Cap or A Tax?” Yale Global 360 , 9th May.
Schumpeter, Joseph (1942) Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, New York: Harper. 
19   |   Democracy, climate change and global governance   |   David Held & Angus Fane Hervey   |   November 2009
p
o
l
i
c
y
 
n
e
t
w
o
r
k
 
p
a
p
e
rp
o
l
i
c
y
 
n
e
t
w
o
r
k
 
p
a
p
e
r
20   |   Citizenship: tool or reward?   |   Elena Jurado  |   February 2008 www.policy-network.net
Stephens, Tim (2009) International Courts and Environmental Protection, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Stern, Sir Nicholas (2004) The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, London, HM Treasury, Government
of the United Kingdom.
Stern, Sir Nicholas (2009) A Blueprint For a Safer Planet, London: The Bodley Head.
Stiglitz, Joseph & Sir Nicholas Stern (2009) “Obama’s Chance to Lead a Green Recovery,” Financial Times, March 2nd.
Stiglitz, Joseph (2007) Making Globalization Work, London: Penguin. 
Torras, Mariano and James Boyce (1998) (Income, inequality, and pollution: An assessment of the environmental Kuznets 
curve,” Ecological Economics, 25. 
UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (2008), Acting on Climate Change: The UN System Delivering as 
One, New York: United Nations.
Victor, David, Granger Morgan, Jay Apt, John Steinbruner, and Katharine Ricke (2009) “The Geoengineering Option: A 
Last Resort Against Global Warming?” Foreign Affairs, March/April. 
Ward, Hugh (2008) “Liberal democracy and sustainability,” Environmental Politics, 17/3:
 
20   |   Democracy, climate change and global governance   |   David Held & Angus Fane Hervey   |   November 2009
p
o
l
i
c
y
 
n
e
t
w
o
r
k
 
p
a
p
e
r